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INTRODUCTION
We award patents to inventors because we hope to encourage new
ideas. Though it was not always so,1 for nearly four centuries the only justification for a government granting a private party the exclusive right to
make a product has been the hope that doing so will encourage the inven-

*

William H. Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; Partner, Durie Tangri LLP. Thanks
to Margo Bagley, Bernard Chao, Rose Hagan, Tim Holbrook, and Oskar Liivak and participants at the
Works in Progress-Intellectual Property conference for comments on an earlier draft.
1
The English Crown used to award patents that conferred the exclusive right to make a particular
product as political favors. A courtier might receive the exclusive right to make playing cards, for instance, not because he had invented the playing card but simply as a means of acquiring money or regulating trade in the cards. See, e.g., Darcy v. Allin, (1599) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B.); 11 Co. Rep. 84b.
For discussion of the importance of these exceptions, see Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of
the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 615 (1959). That practice ended with the Statute of Monopolies in 1624.
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tion and commercialization of that product.2 Scholars sometimes disagree
over whether the patent system achieves this goal,3 and they frequently dispute how patent law should go about encouraging innovation.4 But they essentially all agree that the goal of the patent system is to encourage new
invention. For this reason, the fundamental requirement for obtaining a patent is that the applicant must have invented something new.5
It is curious, then, that patent law itself purports to pay no attention to
which aspects of a patentee’s invention are in fact new. A patented invention is legally defined by its claims—written definitions of the invention.
And those written definitions virtually never call out what it is that is new
about the patentee’s invention. For example, suppose that makers of widgets have long used a three-step process to manufacture the widget. The inventor of a four-step process that results in higher-quality widgets will not
claim to own merely the fourth step she has discovered. Rather, she is
much more likely to define her invention as including all four steps. Our
hypothetical patentee did not invent the first three steps: all three have been
known in the art for decades. But you wouldn’t know that fact from reading the patent claims.
Even if the parties do identify the novel element of an invention, the
law purports not to care. Longstanding patent law doctrine has decried any
focus on the “point of novelty” of an invention. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which handles patent appeals, evaluates the
claim as a whole, not just the piece of the claim that the patentee actually
added to the storehouse of knowledge. As that court has put it, “there is no
legally recognizable . . . ‘gist,’ or ‘heart’ of the invention.”6
Refusing to focus on the point of novelty sometimes benefits patent
owners, for example when a court decides that an invention is novel because no one publication includes all the elements of the patent claim even
though the invention adds nothing new to the world. But it can also hurt
2

See, e.g., Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.); Klitzke, supra note 1, at 624 (citing an English proclamation in 1327 that tied the granting of franchises to the encouragement of
progress in cloth-making).
3
See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008)
(arguing that patent law impedes innovation and should be abolished).
4
See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 66–78 (2009) (describing various conflicting theories about how the patent system promotes
innovation).
5
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (requiring novelty).
6
See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim 1 (Feb. 24, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769270 (“The term ‘invention’ appears in many critical statutory locations.
Yet we have been taught, perhaps brainwashed, to give the term zero substantive import. Substantive
use of the invention has been purged from patent doctrine. Instead every substantive question in patent
law is answered by reference to the claims, the legal descriptions of the ‘metes and bounds’ of a patent’s
exclusionary reach.”).
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patent owners, as it does when a defendant escapes liability for infringing a
patent because even though he copied the new feature of the patentee’s invention, he did not include an old element required by the patent claim.7
It turns out, however, to be hard to sustain a rule that a law concerned
with novelty will pay no attention to the point of novelty. And so point-ofnovelty issues crop up in a number of different doctrines in patent law: who
counts as an inventor, whether the inventor has disclosed the “best mode”
of practicing the invention, and when the sale of a product exhausts the patentee’s rights in the patent.8 Courts are inconsistent in whether and how
they consider the point of novelty in answering these questions, but when
the Federal Circuit is presented with a question in point-of-novelty terms, it
most often falls back on the mantra that there is no point of novelty—no
“gist” or “heart”—to an invention, even if such a holding means discarding
longstanding precedent.
It is time to rethink the point-of-novelty doctrine in patent law. I argue
that ignoring the point of novelty of an invention makes little sense as an
across-the-board matter and leads to a variety of harmful consequences. Although refusing to focus on the point of novelty serves some valuable purposes, there are other ways to achieve those objectives. In the end, a patent
regime that pays attention to what the patentee actually invented, not what
the patent lawyer wrote down, is more likely to achieve the goal of promoting innovation.
This Essay is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the point-ofnovelty doctrine and why it exists. Part II describes the variety of situations
in which patent law either applies or ignores that doctrine, either explicitly
or implicitly. Part III argues that patent law would be better off focusing on
the point of novelty in evaluating inventions.
I.

THE POINT-OF-NOVELTY DOCTRINE

A. Origins: The Rise of Peripheral Claiming
To understand how patent law found itself in the odd position of ignoring the very thing that makes the patentee’s invention novel, we must start
with the central role of the patent claim in every aspect of the law. Patent
law defines the patentee’s invention not by what she actually built or described but by the parameters of the patent claims. Claims are the legal definition of the invention.9 They are theoretically akin to the “metes and
7

See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 57–61, 86–89 and accompanying text.
9
E.g., Sinorgchem Co., Shandong v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“The basic principle of determining the scope of patent claims is that the
claims provide the legal definition of the invention that is patented . . . .”).
8
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bounds” of a real property deed because they define the outer boundaries of
the patentee’s property.10 Unlike a real property deed, though, they rarely
give much notice to the world of where those boundaries actually are.11 Because the words of the claim, not what the patentee actually built, determines both whether the patent is valid and whether a defendant has
infringed it,12 claim language has come to have talismanic significance in
patent law. Indeed, essentially every patent case involves many different
fights over the meaning of the words written by lawyers to try to capture the
outer boundaries of the patentee’s legal right.13
It was not always thus. In the early decades of the country’s history,
patents did not have claims at all. A patent case was resolved by looking at
what the patentee had built, assessing whether it was different from what
had been built before and then comparing it to what the defendant had
built.14 When patentees began to write claims in the nineteenth century,
they served as sign posts calling out the key new feature of the patentee’s
invention, not as fence posts identifying the outer boundaries.15 It was not
until sometime after 1870 that courts converted from a central claiming system, in which the patentee identified what was new about her invention, to a
peripheral claiming system, in which the patentee sought to fence off whatever territory she could claim.16
Even after the move to peripheral claims, some vestiges of central
claiming remained. A notable example is the so-called “Jepson” claim, in
which patentees would claim their invention by stating what was already
10

See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (4th ed. 2007) (“[I]nnumerable cases analogize claims to the ‘metes and
bounds’ of a real property deed.”); cf. CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co., 224 F.3d
1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“It is the totality of the prosecution history which defines and establishes
the metes and bounds of the patent grant.”).
11
See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46–94 (2008) (explaining how patent claims
fail to provide sufficient notice of the boundaries of the invention).
12
See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101,
105 (2005).
13
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744–45 (2009).
14
See id. at 1766–71.
15
See id. at 1767 (“[P]atent drafters began to break out of the text a distinct, separate statement of
the novel features of the invention as a one sentence ‘claim,’ in order to avoid the possibility that the
patent might be viewed as intended to claim everything in the full description of the invention.”).
16
Id. at 1769 (“Claims were initially thought of only as devices for clarifying the grant of a patent
for validity purposes, but after some period of time, courts began employing claims in determining infringement as well. The result of this shift, not surprisingly, was for claims drafters to attempt to cover,
by explicit claim language, every equivalent that a court might previously have recognized under the
doctrine of equivalents. Peripheral construction of claims gave every incentive for inventors, and the
attorneys who represented them, to begin claiming out to the very edge of what was patentable.” (footnote omitted)).
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known and then identifying their improvement.17 Thus, a Jepson claim
might read
In an automobile containing at least a chassis, wheels, a steering mechanism, a
windshield, and wipers for said windshield, the improvement in which said
wipers can be caused to function intermittently.

In a sense, virtually all inventions are Jepson inventions: very few patents
cover entirely new things as opposed to improvements on existing things.
But Jepson claiming has fallen out of favor. As late as 1980, nearly 15% of
all patent claims were drafted in Jepson format.18 By 2008, that number had
fallen to less than 1%.19
With the move to peripheral claiming, patent courts began focusing
more and more attention on the language of the patent claims. That trend
accelerated in 1996, when the Supreme Court decided that construing the
meaning of those claims was a question of law for the courts.20 Perhaps it
was inevitable that courts interpreting patent claim language would attempt
to give meaning to all words, as they do with statutes and contracts, rather
than picking and choosing the words that seem important.
B. Combination Inventions and Obviousness
In any event, there was an important class of invention for which
choosing the point of novelty did not seem to make much sense: the combination patent. Imagine a patent on a Reese’s Peanut Butter Cup. Chocolate
is known in the prior art. So, separately, is peanut butter. Reese, our inventor, combines them.21 What is the novel piece of the invention? Neither
chocolate nor peanut butter is new; the novelty lies in the combination.
In many cases, patent courts must decide whether combination inventions of this sort are obvious to one skilled in the art.22 The rule against focusing on the point of novelty of an invention developed out of those cases,
17

Ex parte Jepson, 1917 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 62, 67–68.
Aaron R. Feigelson, Endangered Species: The Jepson Claim, 12:01 TUESDAY (June 2, 2009, 2:23
PM), http://www.1201tuesday.com/1201_tuesday/2009/06/jepson.html (updated June 4, 2009, 1:56
PM).
19
Id.
20
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996); Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
21
The candy manufacturer used to advertise the supposed serendipity of this combination with an
accidental collision between two people, one of whom says, “Hey, you got your chocolate in my peanut
butter,” to which the other replies, “You got peanut butter in my chocolate.” See, e.g., Vintage 80s
Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups Commercial W Walkers, YOUTUBE (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=DJLDF6qZUX0.
22
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1159–82 (2002) (describing judicial confusion and error when assessing the validity of
complex software and biotechnology patents).
18
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and the Federal Circuit has been particularly insistent in obviousness cases
that there is no “gist,” “heart,” “core,” or point of novelty of an invention.23
C. The Rule Expands
But the point-of-novelty doctrine is not limited to the law of obviousness.24 It also extends to anticipation: to invalidate a patent on grounds that
it has been invented before, a single prior art reference must include all the
elements of the claim in one document; if it doesn’t, the reference can’t anticipate the claim even if everyone agrees that the omitted element is wellknown in the art.25 The rule against selecting a point of novelty applies to
the related doctrine of double patenting, which prevents acquiring two patents on the same invention.26 It extends to the scope of patentable subject
matter: a mathematical algorithm standing alone is probably not patentable,
but the same algorithm implemented in a general-purpose computer probably is.27 It affects what the patentee must disclose: a patent is invalid if the
23

See, e.g., Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Imps. Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“[T]here is no legally recognizable ‘heart’ of the invention.”); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. BarnesHind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 449 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “[t]he court must view the
claimed invention as a whole” and decrying the district court’s focus on a distilled “gist” or “core” of
the invention); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]here is no legally
recognizable or protected ‘essential,’ ‘gist,’ or ‘heart’ of the invention.”); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman
Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1543 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (criticizing appellant for focusing on the
“purported point of novelty” rather than the invention “as a whole” in its obviousness arguments (internal quotation marks omitted)); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
24
For a nice discussion of the role of the doctrine in a variety of contexts, see Bernard Chao, Breaking Aro’s Commandment: Recognizing That Inventions Have Heart, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 1183 (2010).
25
E.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1100–01 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Notions of
‘concept’, ‘essence’, ‘key’, ‘gist’, etc., are no more useful in the context of § 102 than elsewhere, because they divert the fact-finder’s attention from the subject matter of the invention as a whole. . . . ‘Anticipation’ for the purposes of § 102 requires ‘the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements
of a claimed invention arranged as in that claim’.” (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d
1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
26
E.g., Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[R]ather than focusing on
the point of novelty, we wish to clarify that double patenting is determined by analysis of the claims as a
whole.”).
27
Recently, the law on this subject has been in turmoil as a result of Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010), which held that Bilski’s patent claim was too abstract but failed to provide any framework
for defining abstractness. See id. at 3231; see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The court today . . . impose[s] a new and far-reaching restriction on the
kinds of inventions that are eligible to participate in the patent system . . . by redefining the word
‘process’ in the patent statute, to exclude all processes that do not transform physical matter or that are
not performed by machines. The court thus excludes many of the kinds of inventions that apply today’s
electronic and photonic technologies, as well as other processes that handle data and information in novel ways.”); infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text (describing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978),
in which the Supreme Court held that a novel mathematical algorithm should not be patentable). But the
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inventor fails to describe his best mode of practicing the invention even if
the omitted description is of a favored way of practicing an element long
known in the art.28 It is relevant in claim construction: a patent claim cannot be construed to include elements that are not expressly present in the
claim even if the text of the patent reveals that those elements are the heart
of the invention.29 It affects infringement: a defendant will escape liability
if she omits even one element of a claim even if that element has nothing to
do with the inventor’s idea.30 And while the doctrine of equivalents exists
to avoid the unfairness of such a result by finding infringement where new
products are only insubstantially different from the patented invention, that
doctrine too has been limited so that each element of a patent claim must
have an equivalent, not on the invention as a whole or what makes it
unique.31 Finally, the rule against considering the point of novelty affects
damages: a reasonable royalty is calculated based on the royalty base of

patentability of an algorithm implemented in a general purpose computer was clearly the law throughout
the 1980s and 1990s. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001). For a brief time before 1981, the courts did focus on
the point of novelty in evaluating patentability, see, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 588, but after 1981, that was
no longer the case, see, e.g., In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 791 (C.C.P.A. 1982). For a discussion of the
implications of Bilski, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman & R. Polk
Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011).
For other applications of point-of-novelty analysis with respect to patentable subject matter, see In re
Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1983), which casts doubt on the viability of the “printed
matter” exception to patentable subject matter because that doctrine improperly focused on the point of
novelty rather than on the invention as a whole.
28
See, e.g., Ajinomoto Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 597 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
invention is the invention claimed. It is not limited, as Ajinomoto asserts, to vague ‘innovative aspects’
or ‘inventive features’ of the invention, terms that appear nowhere in our best mode case law.” (citation
omitted)).
29
See MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We
sympathize with the district court’s choice, since we agree that [the feature] is an essential element of
the invention . . . . However, we cannot endorse a construction analysis that does not identify ‘a textual
reference in the actual language of the claim with which to associate a proffered claim construction.’”
(quoting Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999))); Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. BioGenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Ormco Corp. v. Align
Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
30
See Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[I]f one or
more of the claim limitations are not literally present in the accused device, [this] preclud[es] a finding
of literal infringement . . . .”). In Larami Corp. v. Amron, for instance, the inventor of a pump-action
compressed air mechanism for extending the range of a water gun lost a patent suit against a defendant
who used the same mechanism because the defendant’s products did not include an element of the claim
related to where the water was stored in the gun. 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1280. 1283–84 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The
water storage element was in the prior art, a necessary component of all water guns; the novelty of the
patentee’s invention was in the compressed air pump. See id. at 1281.
31
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21, 29 (1997); Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934–35 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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products actually sold,32 which is in turn affected by the scale of the product
being claimed.33 For example, if the inventor of the intermittent windshield
wiper claims an improved car containing the wiper, damages may well be
calculated based on the price of the whole car because we don’t distinguish
between the novel elements of the claim and the preexisting ones.
In short, the rule that there is no point of novelty, no heart of the invention, is well established in many areas of patent law beyond obviousness.34
Indeed, the principle is so accepted that the Federal Circuit has used it to
dismantle longstanding doctrines that depend on a point of novelty. In
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the court abolished the longstanding
point-of-novelty test for design patents, which had required proof that the
defendant copied a novel aspect of the plaintiff’s design.35 The court replaced the point-of-novelty test with the ordinary-observer test for infringement, which asks whether an ordinary observer would think the
plaintiff’s and defendant’s designs were the same even if the similarities
were already known in the art.36
II. CRACKS IN THE FAÇADE
Despite the Federal Circuit’s widespread adoption of the rule against
focus on a point of novelty, the point-of-novelty approach keeps reappearing in a variety of contexts. Perhaps this is inevitable: it often makes little
or no sense to ignore what is novel about the invention. Section A considers some contexts in which point-of-novelty analysis survives in patent law.
Section B considers some circumstances in which it doesn’t but arguably
should.

32

Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Calculation
of a reasonable royalty . . . requires determination of . . . a royalty base, or the revenue pool implicated
by the infringement . . . .”).
33
See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing
patent damages and the relevant factors of a reasonable royalty calculus, including “what plaintiff’s
property was, to what extent defendant has taken it, its usefulness and commercial value as shown by its
advantages over other things and by the extent of its use, and the commercial situation” (citations omitted in original) (quoting Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
34
See, e.g., Chao, supra note 24, at 1185 (referring to the rule that there is no point of novelty as
“one of the basic commandments in patent law”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2160 (2008) (calling point of novelty a “rejected concept”); F.
Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking Contracting Options off the
Table?, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315, 321 (2007) (arguing that the line of cases that focused on
the point of novelty has been “jettison[ed]”).
35
543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
36
Id. at 670, 678.
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A. Ignoring the Commandment
Despite its status as a “commandment” of patent law,37 the Federal Circuit has often ignored the no-point-of-novelty rule when circumstances demanded it. Here are a few examples.
1. Inventorship.—Joint inventorship is quite common.38 And because
joint inventors each own an undivided interest in the whole patent,39 people
other than the named inventor often claim that they should have been included as joint inventors as well.40
An individual is a joint inventor of a patent if she contributes to the
conception of that invention.41 Merely building the device someone else has
designed is not invention.42 But if the putative joint inventor contributed to
the conception of the invention as claimed, she is entitled to be listed on the
patent and to jointly own the resulting invention.43
That legal standard sits uneasily, however, with the rule against a point
of novelty. Imagine that the inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper
took my advice above and claimed a car with various features, including
wheels, a chassis, a steering column, and an intermittent windshield wiper.
Can the inventor’s lab assistant claim to be a joint inventor by suggesting
that the car should have wheels? If we took seriously the idea that all claim
elements were coequal, there would be no more value to contributing the
novel feature of the invention than to contributing something from the prior
art. But of course that is nonsense. And the law properly denies inventorship claims from people who contribute only knowledge found in the prior
art.44 In doing so, the law focuses on the point of novelty: those who con37

Chao, supra note 24, at 1185.
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of
Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2000) (reporting that “[m]ost inventions in [their]
study were not developed by a single individual” and that the median patent issued between June 1996
and May 1998 had more than one inventor).
39
See Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Each co-owner
of a United States patent is ordinarily free to make, use, offer to sell, and sell the patented invention
without regard to the wishes of any other co-owner.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2006)).
40
For examples from among the myriad cases involving such claims, see Shum v. Intel Corp.,
499 F.3d 1272, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 1303–04, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1458–60 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1226–27 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
41
E.g., BJ Servs. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 338 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
42
See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460.
43
See id. Indeed, she must contribute to only one claim in order to have ownership rights over
every claim in the patent. Id.
44
See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 376 F.3d at 1362 (“A contribution of information in the prior art cannot give
rise to joint inventorship because it is not a contribution to conception.”); Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d
38
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tribute new claim elements are inventors; those who contribute claim elements from the prior art are not. Any other rule would be unworkable because it would treat as joint inventors any number of people who did not in
fact contribute anything that made the invention patentable.
2. Inequitable Conduct.—Patent law punishes those who lie to the
patent office by deeming their patents unenforceable.45 But “inequitable
conduct” is committed not only by those who affirmatively mislead the
PTO but also by applicants who withhold relevant prior art.46 Relevance is,
as always with patent law, determined by the patent claims.47 Here too a
strict rule that all claim elements are equal proves unworkable. Just as we
don’t want the person who suggested adding wheels to a car to get credit for
the intermittent windshield wiper, we don’t want windshield-wiper inventors to have their patents rendered unenforceable because they didn’t turn
over prior art relating to wheels or car bodies.
Once again, the law accommodates this concern by reintroducing the
point-of-novelty analysis. Relevant prior art is defined as information that a
reasonable patent examiner would have considered material to a determination of patentability.48 And courts regularly recognize that examiners will
only consider prior art to be material if it is at the point of novelty of the invention.49 We may act in other contexts as if all claim elements are equal,
but in inequitable conduct, as in inventorship, we recognize that they are
not.

1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“All that is required of a joint inventor is that he or she (1) contribute in
some significant manner to the conception or reduction to practice of the invention, (2) make a contribution to the claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured
against the dimension of the full invention, and (3) do more than merely explain to the real inventors
well-known concepts and/or the current state of the art.”); Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460 (“One who simply
provides the inventor with well-known principles or explains the state of the art . . . does not qualify as a
joint inventor.”).
Combination patents present a problem for this rule because often each putative inventor is contributing a piece from the prior art. The inventor in that instance should be whoever thought to combine
the prior art elements in a novel way. For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.A.
45
See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559–60 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
46
See id.
47
See id.
48
Id. at 1562.
49
See, e.g., eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTec USA, L.L.C., 480 F.3d 1129, 1136–37 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding undisclosed declarations material because they were related to the point of novelty of the application); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (finding inequitable conduct where the examiner twice reiterated the importance of a specific
point of novelty in the application and the applicant therefore should have known that any information
related to that point of novelty would be material to the examiner); see also Pharmacia Corp. v. Par
Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]hese misleading declarations go to the very
point of novelty.”).
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3. Contributory Infringement.—To infringe a patent, a defendant
must make, use, or sell a product or process that incorporates each and
every element of the patent claim.50 If even one element is missing, there is
no infringement. Infringement liability extends not only to those who actually make, use, or sell the infringing technology51 but also to those who
materially contribute to infringement by another.52 A defendant contributes
to infringement by selling a product that is a “material part” of a patented
invention to another that he knows will use the product as part of an infringing combination.53
We worry about holding the sellers of ordinary goods—say, car tires—
liable for the uses to which their products are put. If every seller of tires,
computers, or screws had to worry about patent infringement liability based
on what her customers did with the products she sold, modern commerce
would be much more difficult. As a result, patent law creates a safe harbor
for the sellers of products. They are not liable for contributory infringement
for selling products that are “staple article[s] . . . of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use.”54 Because of this safe harbor, a seller’s liability for contributory infringement depends not only on whether some buyers use her product to infringe but also on whether other buyers have
legitimate uses for the product. If the only substantial use of the product is
in the patented combination, the product itself is essentially treated as within the scope of the patent, and the patentee can prevent its sale.55
In effect, the doctrine of contributory infringement creates a point-ofnovelty rule. If a component was already known in the prior art before the
patentee’s invention—that is, it has other uses already—the sale of that
component will not trigger liability. But one who sells a new component
specially designed to work in the patented invention is liable. Liability for
contributory infringement accordingly depends on whether the component
sold is at the point of novelty of the invention or merely a claim element
that recites the prior art.56
50

See MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.2 (2009), available at http://www.
nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/NationalPatentJuryInstructions.pdf.
51
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
52
See id. § 271(c).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
§3.3a2 (2d ed. Supp. 2010) (discussing cases drawing this line).
56
The line is not quite this clear. Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. suggests that, in very
unusual circumstances, a defendant might be liable for selling a preexisting product. 448 U.S. 176, 221–
23 (1980). The chemical in that case, propanil, had been known for decades, but it had no known use
until the patentees began using it as an herbicide and patented that use. See id. at 181–82. So we can
think of propanil as a useful product as constituting the point of novelty of the invention.
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4. Exhaustion.—A patent owner exhausts her control over a patented
device with the first authorized sale.57 That’s why one doesn’t need a patent
license to drive a car or to resell it used, despite the fact that the car undoubtedly has patented technology in it.58
This exhaustion doctrine is fairly straightforward when the item the patentee sells is the very item she patented. When the two don’t coincide,
however, things grow more complicated. Selling a car with intermittent
windshield wipers on it should exhaust the patentee’s rights over that particular automobile. So, arguably, should selling intermittent windshield wipers standing alone. But selling a car without intermittent windshield
wipers shouldn’t exhaust the patent rights even if the car has all the other
elements of the patent claim.
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court
resolved this problem by asking whether the product being sold captured
the “essential features” of the invention.59 The sale there was by a licensee,
Intel, of chips that defendant Quanta put into its devices. LG owned a patent on methods of configuring devices with those chips. Intel paid LG for
a license to make the chips, on the theory that the chips had no substantial
use except to infringe the LG patent, such that Intel would be contributing
to infringement by selling them. After Intel paid LG for the license, LG
sought to get paid again by the downstream device manufacturers, including
Quanta, who LG claimed directly infringed its patents by using Intel products incorporating LG’s patents.60 The Court concluded that LG’s license to
Intel exhausted its patent rights because Intel made an authorized sale, not
of the whole invention but of the “essential features”—that is, the product
that was at the point of novelty.61
5. Occasional Uses: Claim Construction, Obviousness, and Enablement.—Even in claim construction and obviousness cases, the bastions of
the “no heart of the invention” doctrine, courts don’t always apply that canon consistently. That’s because doing so often has silly consequences.
For example, in Slimfold Manufacturing Co. v. Kinkead Industries, Inc., the
patent claim was to a device for bifold doors with an improved spring that
allowed them to be easily installed.62 Doctrinally, the rule is clear: the invention is a door that has certain parts (e.g., wood, a knob, hinges). But the
court ignored all that, reasoning that the invention as a whole was not the
door but a pivot rod assembly for the door because all the other elements of
57

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008).
That is, of course, unless it’s more than twenty years old and the patents have expired. In which
case, you really should get a new car. The American economy is counting on you.
59
553 U.S. at 631 (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249–51 (1942)).
60
This is admittedly a simplification of the facts. For more detail, see id. at 621–24.
61
Id. at 633–34, 638.
62
932 F.2d 1453, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
58
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the door were well known.63 In other words, the real invention—the point
of novelty—was the pivot rod assembly.
Courts in obviousness cases do something similar when confronted
with patent claims in which the only difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is a different numerical range, whether of percentage
chemical composition, binding activity, temperature, or any other element.
For instance, in Iron Grip Barbell Co., the prior art disclosed circular
weights with one, two, and four handholds, and the patentee claimed a circular weight with three handholds.64 The worry with these claims is that patentees may be filling in gaps in the prior art by identifying a known
technology and claiming around the edges of that technology. In those cases, courts abandon their focus on the supposedly coequal elements of the
invention and, surprisingly for a patent system that otherwise never puts the
burden on the patentee to prove entitlement to a patent, presume that the invention is obvious.65 To overcome that presumption, the patentee must
show that the particular range chosen is “critical” to the success of the invention.66 Only if the new range (the novel piece of the invention) is significantly different from the old will the patent be considered nonobvious.
Finally, one recent Federal Circuit decision has applied a point-ofnovelty approach to enablement, the requirement that patentees provide sufficient instructions that one of skill in the art can make and use their invention.67 In Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. BMW of North
America, Inc., the court held that a patent claim that covered both mechanical and electronic impact sensors for airbags was not supported by a patent
specification that only taught mechanical sensors.68 The patentee tried to
avoid this result by arguing that people in the field would know how to construct an electronic sensor and that, therefore, the patentee didn’t have to
teach it.69 The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, concluding that the
specification, not the general knowledge of the field, must teach the “novel
63

See id.
Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
65
See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We find this case
analogous to the optimization of a range or other variable within the claims that flows from the ‘normal
desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known.’” (quoting In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); In re Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330 (“We therefore conclude
that a prior art reference that discloses a range encompassing a somewhat narrower claimed range is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness.”); In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276 (C.C.P.A.
1980).
66
In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The law is replete with cases in which
the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is some range or other variable within the
claims. . . . [I]n such a situation, the applicant must show that the particular range is critical, generally
by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range.”).
67
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 112(a) (West 2011).
68
501 F.3d 1274, 1281–82, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
69
Id. at 1283.
64
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aspects” of the invention.70 The court thus distinguished between the novel
elements and other elements; the patent doesn’t have to teach the latter as
long as people in the field can figure them out.
Inventorship, inequitable conduct, contributory infringement, and exhaustion are all doctrines that explicitly invoke the point of novelty. Not so
for claim construction, enablement, or obviousness. But even in those latter
doctrines we can find instances of courts paying attention to the heart of the
invention when it seems foolish to do anything else.
B. Blindly Following the Commandment
As we have seen, courts don’t always follow their own point-ofnovelty rule. Sometimes they do pay attention to the point of novelty of an
invention. But in many other cases, courts recite the mantra that there is no
heart of the invention and use that rule to decide cases. Quite often, though,
applying the no-point-of-novelty doctrine leads them astray. I discuss some
examples in this section.
1. Repair and Reconstruction.—We begin with the area of law that
gives rise to the no-point-of-novelty doctrine: the law of repair. Once patent law established that the owner of a particular patented machine was
free to use or sell it as he pleased, problems began to arise around owners’
efforts to repair the device rather than purchase a new one from the patentholder. The exhaustion doctrine was supposed to give the purchaser control over the thing he bought, not exempt him from ever having to buy from
the patentholder again. Courts faced with these cases drew a line between
“repair” of a patented invention, which was within the scope of the exhaustion right, and “reconstruction” of the invention, which was tantamount to
impermissibly building a new copy.71
But how do we know when an owner is repairing and when he is reconstructing? In Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., Convertible Top Replacement owned a patent on convertible car top
70

See id. (“It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the
novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement.” (quoting Genentech, Inc. v.
Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For criticism of this result, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J.
779 (2011).
71
For discussion of this shift, see Arthur J. Gajarsa, Evelyn Mary Aswad & Joseph S. Cianfrani,
How Much Fuel to Add to the Fire of Genius? Some Questions About the Repair/Reconstruction Distinction in Patent Law, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1205 (1999), which explores the confused repair–
reconstruction jurisprudence and discussing challenges for patentees in attempting to redefine “impermissible reconstruction” through contracts with their buyers, and Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV.
423 (1999), which argues that the exhaustion principle should not continue to serve as the organizing
principle behind the repair–reconstruction line.
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assemblies that functioned with fabric covers.72 The defendant, Aro, sold
replacement fabric car tops.73 The district court and the court of appeals
held that Aro’s sales of the replacement car tops crossed the line from repair
into reconstruction because the top was a major feature of the invention so
that no one could call it a “minor repair” to the overall invention.74 The Supreme Court reversed. In language that gave rise to the no-point-of-novelty
doctrine, the Court said that it didn’t matter that the fabric tops were the
most important part of the invention because “this Court has made it
clear . . . that there is no legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a combination patent.”75
Bernard Chao has done an able job of dismantling the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Aro.76 I won’t repeat his criticisms here. But it is worth noting
that the Court’s insistence that there was no heart of the invention led it to
what may well be the wrong result. The Court held that car owners could
bypass the patent on convertible top assemblies by replacing what is arguably the most important part of the top an unlimited number of times.77 The
issue is further complicated because the patent was on a combination. But
unless the novel feature of the invention was something other than the
whole assembly, the Court’s decision allowed a third-party supplier to capture a significant part of the value supposedly resident in the invention.
2. Written Description.—Section 112 of the Patent Act requires that
the patentee provide a written description of her invention that is sufficiently clear to enable any person having ordinary skill in the art to make and
use the invention.78 The Federal Circuit has interpreted this language to impose two separate requirements: that the patentee teach enough to enable a
person having ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention and,
separately, that the patent contain a “written description” of the invention.79
Courts and scholars have struggled to explain why we need a written
description requirement separate from the enablement requirement.80 After
72

365 U.S. 336, 337–38 (1961).
Id. at 338.
74
See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 270 F.2d 200, 205 (1st Cir. 1959).
75
Aro, 365 U.S. at 344–45.
76
See Chao, supra note 24, at 1205–14. Among other things, Chao points out that the two cases the
Supreme Court relied upon as evidence of this proposition were 1940s cases that Congress specifically
intended to reverse in passing the 1952 Patent Act. See id. at 1209–14.
77
See Aro, 365 U.S. at 346.
78
35 U.S.C.A. § 112(a) (West 2011).
79
See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
80
See, e.g., Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Rader, J., concurring) (“[O]utside its proper context of policing priority, [the written description requirement] never makes sense but compounds the confusion, increases the chances for error, and augments the expense of the trial process. . . . The erroneous written description requirement . . . lacks both
a statutory and a logical foundation.”); Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper
73
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all, if an ordinary scientist in the field understands the invention and can
make use of it, shouldn’t that be enough? The most reasonable theory is
that proof of written description is necessary to show that the patentee was
in possession of the invention at the time she filed her patent application.81
On this view, the written description requirement is designed to prevent
“late claiming” by a patentee who changes her claims during the prosecution process to cover things she didn’t actually understand when she filed
her patent application. That approach was adopted by the Federal Circuit in
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.82 The patentee there amended its
claims to cover the defendant’s idea, one the patentee clearly didn’t have in
mind when it filed its original application.83
Unfortunately, subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have used the nopoint-of-novelty rule to read Gentry Gallery—and the late-claiming concern—out of written description law. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. is instructive:
TKT’s remaining arguments rely on Gentry Gallery. However, we see Gentry
Gallery as similarly inapt. TKT would have us view Gentry as a watershed
case, in reliance on an isolated statement—probably only dicta—that one of
ordinary skill in the art would clearly understand that the location of the reclining controls on the claimed sectional sofa “was not only important, but essential to [the] invention.” But as we recently indicated in Cooper Cameron
Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., “we did not announce [in Gentry] a
new ‘essential element’ test mandating an inquiry into what an inventor considers to be essential to his invention and requiring that the claims incorporate
those elements.” . . . cf. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.
Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO,
17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2007) (concluding that the written description requirement has had a relatively minor impact in the courts and the PTO); Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending
with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2000) (arguing that by perpetuating an artificial distinction between the written description and the enablement requirements, the Federal Circuit has given itself unchecked authority to
invalidate patent claims for inadequate disclosure); Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (2007) (arguing that most written description cases
could have been decided on enablement grounds instead); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application
of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615
(1998) (arguing that the written description requirement would likely chill development in biotechnology and discourage prompt disclosure of new inventions); Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 209, 222 (1998) (describing the
establishment of a written description requirement as “an unmitigated disaster”).
81
Enablement might serve that purpose too. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law,
59 SMU L. REV. 123, 147–50 (2006).
82
134 F.3d 1473, 1479–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1341, 1351 (explaining that
in order to satisfy the written description requirement, “the specification must describe an invention understandable to [the] skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed”
(emphasis added)).
83
See Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479.
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(“[T]here is no legally recognizable or protected ‘essential element,’ ‘gist’ or
‘heart’ of the invention in a combination patent.”).84

Unfortunately, in doing so the Federal Circuit has replaced a conceptually
sound basis for a separate written description requirement with one that is
impossible to distinguish from enablement except that it seems to apply
even when enablement doesn’t. A requirement that a patentee must describe and show possession of the “full scope” of a patented invention arguably makes no sense as applied to modern peripheral claims, which cover
an infinite number of possible embodiments.85 A written description doctrine that requires proof that the patentee actually possessed the novel features of the invention at the time of filing makes sense. A written
description doctrine that doesn’t focus on those novel features does not.
3. Best Mode.—The first paragraph of § 112 also requires that the patentee set forth the “best mode” she knows of practicing her invention.86
Unlike most doctrines in patent law, which focus on what the person of skill
in the art would perceive, the best mode doctrine is entirely subjective.
Whether the inventor has a preferred mode of implementing the invention
and, if so, what it is depend entirely on the mindset of the individual named
inventor.
In Ajinomoto Co. v. International Trade Commission, the patentee
claimed a method for cultivating a strain of bacteria to produce L-lysine but
did not disclose the particular bacteria the inventor favored.87 The patentee
argued that it had disclosed the best mode of practicing the “innovative aspects” of the invention, but the court rejected that argument, falling back on
the idea that there is no point of novelty in a patent.88 The best mode requirement, it said, “is not limited . . . to vague ‘innovative aspects’ or ‘inventive features’ of the invention, terms that appear nowhere in our best
mode case law.”89
The best mode doctrine has been criticized as a potential trap for the
unwary because it is not obvious to nonspecialists that they must do more

84

314 F.3d 1313, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (alterations in original) (citations omitted); see also VasCath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (chastising the district court for attempting
to identify the “novel or important” part of the invention).
85
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1222–25 (2008).
86
35 U.S.C.A. § 112(a) (West 2011). The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act of 2011 provides that
failure to satisfy the best mode requirement will no longer render a patent invalid in cases filed after
September 16, 2011. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15. So this section is primarily of historical interest. But
best mode remains a requirement for patentees, at least in theory.
87
597 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
88
Id. at 1273–74.
89
Id. at 1274.
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than teach people of skill in the art how to make and use their inventions.90
Unfortunately, the no-point-of-novelty rule heightens this problem. An inventor might know that she needs to disclose the technical details of her favored implementation of her new idea. Unless she reads patent cases,
however, she is unlikely to suspect that she must disclose her favored ways
of practicing those elements of the invention that have long been known in
the art. Under this doctrine, the court would invalidate a patent on the car
with intermittent windshield wipers if the inventor did not disclose her preferred brand of tires, a rather extreme requirement.
4. Design Patents.—The law of design patents quite prominently featured a point-of-novelty rule until recently. Unlike standard “utility” patents covering inventions, which are defined by the language of written
claims, design patents covering new ornamental features of an object are
defined in substantial part by a drawing of the patentee’s design.91 The basic test for infringement of a design patent is the “ordinary observer” test,
which assesses “whether an ordinary observer, familiar with the prior art,
would be deceived into thinking that the accused design was the same as the
patented design.”92 But that test has long been supplemented by a requirement that the defendant have appropriated the point of novelty of the invention.93 If the defendant’s use didn’t include the novel feature(s) in the
patentee’s design, it couldn’t infringe.
In 2008, in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the Federal Circuit
changed the law of design patents to eliminate the point-of-novelty test for
infringement.94 The court worried that a focus on the point of novelty
would confuse factfinders, particularly in the subset of cases in which the
patentee’s invention was a combination of existing features rather than the
development of a new one.95 The focus, as with utility patents, must be on
the overall appearance of the whole design, not on “small” differences at
the point of novelty.96 Novelty still matters, but now only as a defense that

90

See Harold C. Wegner, Continued Prosecution in a Continuation Application, or a Transco Best
Mode Trap for the Unwary?, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 837 (1993); see also NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 120–21 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard
C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (recommending that the doctrine be eliminated for other reasons). Legislation proposed in Congress in the past decade would have eliminated the doctrine. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 4(d)(1)(B).
91
Mary Bellis, Design Patent: The Importance of Great Drawings and Correct Formatting,
ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/od/designpatents/a/design_patent_f_4.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2012).
92
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 672 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
93
Id. at 670–71.
94
Id. at 678.
95
Id. at 677.
96
Id.
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must generally be assessed separately from infringement.97 And subsequent
Federal Circuit cases have used Egyptian Goddess as precedent in concluding that point of novelty is no longer the test for the invalidity of a design
patent either.98
Think about this for a minute. It is no longer the law that the defendant
must incorporate the very thing that makes the patented invention patentable. As long as an ordinary observer would confuse the two products, the
fact that that confusion arises from similarities that already exist in the prior
art doesn’t defeat a finding of infringement. It might or might not create a
defense that the patent is invalid for anticipation, though again that seems to
depend on what an ordinary observer would think when comparing the patented design and the prior art.99 Translated for a moment into terms of utility patents, it is as though we granted a patent on a car having an
intermittent windshield wiper as the novel feature and then allowed the patentee to sue a car maker that didn’t include that feature because the cars
otherwise had the same elements. That can’t possibly be the right rule.
The Federal Circuit did express concerns with how the point-ofnovelty test worked as applied to patents on combinations. I discuss that
concern in more detail in the next Part.100 And the court took some steps to
try to sneak back in the prior-art comparison it had just rejected, declaring
that the ordinary observer was henceforth one who was “familiar with the
prior art.”101 So one reasonable reading of the case is that the court intended
not to make the point of novelty irrelevant but simply to change the burden
of proof on whether the defendant appropriated the novelty of the patentee’s
invention.102 This concern with the appropriate burden of proof is similar to
what motivates the court in utility patent cases to reject the practicing-theprior-art defense103: defendants shouldn’t be able to turn a defense that they
must prove by clear and convincing evidence into something that the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
But if avoiding burden-shifting was the court’s goal, it didn’t do a very
good job of achieving it. Whatever the legal standard, we don’t want patentees suing defendants who do no more than practice the prior art. Such suits
can’t succeed in utility patent law because of the requirement that each element be present in the accused device. If the defendant is merely practicing
97

See id. at 678.
See, e.g., Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1237–38 (Fed. Cir.
2009). For a discussion of this extension, see Marta Kowalczyk, Recent Developments, Design Patent
Infringement: Post-Egyptian Goddess, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 250–56.
99
See Int’l Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1237–38.
100
See infra Part III.A.
101
Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677, 681.
102
See id. at 678–79.
103
See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“‘[P]racticing the prior art’ is not a defense to patent infringement.”).
98
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the prior art and the patent is construed so broadly that it covers what the
defendant is doing, the patent will be invalid.104 So to infringe a utility patent, the defendant must include the thing that makes the invention patentable. But after Egyptian Goddess, there is no longer such a requirement in
design patent law. A design patent can now be infringed even by a product
that lacks the new feature encompassed by the patent as long as an ordinary
observer would think the two were substantially the same. The legal doctrine that prevented that from happening—the point-of-novelty test—fell
victim to the commandment that inventions must not have a gist even when
they do.
5. Claim Construction and Infringement.—In a peripheral claiming
system, the outer boundaries of the patent are defined by the language of the
patent claims. Application of the principle that all elements of a patent have
equal significance creates traps for unwary patent owners. Many, perhaps
all but one, of the elements of a patent claim are efforts to describe existing
technology rather than to define what is new about the patentee’s invention.
But a defendant can avoid infringement by eliminating any one of those
elements even if it appropriates the point of novelty of the patentee’s invention in its entirety.
The result is that patentees often lose their infringement cases because
the defendant designs around the patent by avoiding a seemingly unimportant but claimed feature of the invention. In Larami Corp. v. Amron, for
example, the patentee invented a piston-pump mechanism for a water gun
that allowed the gun to shoot much farther than prior guns.105 The patent
claim covered a water gun with various elements, including a “housing . . .
having a chamber therein for a liquid.”106 The patentee didn’t invent holding water in the barrel of the gun; the element was just included to define
the prior-art gun the patentee had improved. But because the defendant in
that case stored the water outside the barrel of the gun, in a detachable reservoir, the court concluded that it did not infringe the patent.107
In theory, the doctrine of equivalents takes care of problems like this
by allowing a patentee to expand the scope of its claims to cover products
that are only insubstantially different from the patented invention.108 But
the Federal Circuit, in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,109 and the
Supreme Court, a decade later in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co.,110 rejected the idea that a defendant could infringe under the
104
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106
107
108
109
110
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doctrine of equivalents because its product was insubstantially different
from the patent as a whole.111 Rather, the doctrine of equivalents, like literal
infringement, must be measured element by element.112 As a result, it falls
victim to the same problem: the absence of an equivalent of a single priorart element will doom a doctrine-of-equivalents claim. Indeed, the patentee
in Larami lost its doctrine-of-equivalents argument for the same reason it
lost on literal infringement: it didn’t store the water “in” the chamber or anything like it.113
Could the patentee in Larami have solved this problem by drafting the
claims differently? Perhaps, if it had foreseen the change Larami later
made or if it had just been more parsimonious in the words it used in the
claims. But the point for our purposes is that the patentee shouldn’t have
had to worry about the precise formulation of the words used to describe
elements of its product that were already well-known in the art. By focusing attention on every element, including the old ones, the no-point-ofnovelty rule makes it much more likely that patentees will lose the very
cases we should want them to win: ones, like Larami, in which the defendant adopts the novel feature of the patent.
The uncertainty associated with words also means that the no-point-ofnovelty rule renders patent scope less, not more, clear. Patent claims are
supposed to give the world notice of what is and is not claimed.114 But
when patent litigation focuses on ambiguities in the words of claim elements that don’t even relate to what the patentee actually invented, the result is to enlarge the number of things we can’t predict about the validity
and infringement of a patent.
6. Damages.—If patent owners can hamstring themselves by including prior art elements in their patent claims, why do they do it? One answer
has to do with the way damages are calculated. We award as damages either lost profits from sales or, if the patentee can’t show lost profits, a reasonable royalty for the use of the invention.115 Those reasonable royalties
are calculated as a percentage of the sales of a product; that is, the damage
111

Id. at 28–30, 40 (holding that the doctrine of equivalents must involve an element-by-element
comparison); Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934–36 (upholding the district court’s doctrine-of-equivalents analysis because it proceeded element by element).
112
See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29; Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 935.
113
Larami Corp. v. Amron, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1280, 1285–86 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1886) (noting that a claim should not be treated “like a
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award reflects a percentage royalty rate multiplied by the royalty base (the
total sales of the relevant product).116
But what is the relevant product? If it is a small component with limited sales, damages are likely to be small. But if the royalty base is large,
damages are likely to be higher.117 And here is where the no-point-ofnovelty rule works its mischief. Rather than focusing on the novel feature
of the patentee’s invention, the rule requires us to look at the whole claimed
invention, regardless of whether the elements of that invention are novel or
not. As a result, if the inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper claims
a windshield wiper, his damages in a lawsuit will be measured by the sale
of windshield wipers. But if he claims the identical invention as a car with
an intermittent windshield wiper as an element, the royalty base is the sale
of cars, a much larger number. As a result, patent plaintiffs tend to draft
their claims to cover whole products, not the pieces they actually contribute,
and they are inclined to sue downstream integrated manufacturers rather
than upstream component suppliers.
One district court opinion, written by Federal Circuit Chief Judge Rader, suggests that the royalty base should be the smallest marketable unit that
incorporates the invention.118 The Federal Circuit, by contrast, has suggested that the use of a broader royalty base is defensible although mistakenly characterizing the royalty base issue as involving the “entire market
value rule.”119 Regardless of which approach prevails, as long as the “smallest salable unit” is determined by the claims as a whole rather than by the
novel component of the invention, it will be subject to manipulation by patentees seeking to increase the value of their patents.
C. The Problem Is Systemic
Treating old elements of an invention with the same force as the novel
elements creates a number of problems for the patent system. Sometimes
we avoid those problems by ignoring the commandment and focusing on
the point of novelty. When we don’t, we often go astray.
The problem is not simply with particular applications of the no-pointof-novelty principle. The problem is with the principle itself. It makes lit116
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tle sense for a law focused on invention to pay no attention to what is inventive about the patentee’s technology. A legal system that once focused on
what the patentee actually added—demanding a working model of the invention and focusing the inquiry on that actual device120—was replaced over
time by a system that focuses on the words added by patent lawyers. In the
early days of the patent system, there was no such thing as a patent claim.
The claim developed as an optional device written by applicants to call attention to what was new and different about the invention.121 Those claims
gradually became expected, then required, and then the central focus of the
patent inquiry.122 Today, we have reified the claims of the patent to such an
extent that we are unwilling even to look behind those claims to see what
parts of them reflect the patentee’s actual invention. The result shouldn’t be
surprising: both patentees and accused infringers use the ambiguity of those
words to achieve their own ends.123
The problem may be deeper than just the no-point-of-novelty rule. The
heart of the problem may be the law’s focus on the language of lawyercreated claims rather than inventor-created technologies.124 But it seems
clear that the no-point-of-novelty rule exacerbates the problem. It prevents
us from distinguishing the words that represent what the patentee added
from the words that don’t, and it accordingly means that we are even further
removed from the invention we are supposed to be protecting.
III. CAN WE LIVE WITH POINT OF NOVELTY?
Suppose we were to focus the attention of the patent system on the
point of novelty of the invention. Would the sky fall? In this Part, I consider some objections to a point-of-novelty approach and conclude that they
can be overcome without much difficulty.
A. Combination Inventions
The first objection to a point-of-novelty system is the one that caused
courts to shy away from it originally: inventions often take the form of
combinations of existing elements rather than the creation of new ones.
Combination inventions require the combination of all the elements, so one
could argue that all the elements, or perhaps none of them, reflect the point
of novelty.
120

See History, ROTHSCHILD PETERSON PATENT MODEL MUSEUM, http://www.patentmodel.org/
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Combination patents are indeed an important category of inventions.
But it doesn’t follow that a patent has no point of novelty simply because it
is a combination of existing elements. The novelty resides precisely in a
combination that didn’t exist in the prior art: it is that new combination that
should be the focus of our analysis. What we want to know is whether the
idea to combine, say, chocolate and peanut butter, is new and nonobvious;
who thought to combine them and when? Neither chocolate nor peanut butter is the “main” part of the chocolate-plus-peanut-butter claim; it is the
combination of the two that is the central feature of the invention.
We think in precisely that way when considering inventorship claims.
As noted above, a participant in the inventive process is not an inventor
merely because she adds to the claims something known in the prior art. To
be an inventor, she must make a substantial contribution to the novel aspects of the invention.125 For a combination patent, a joint inventor accordingly must contribute to the idea of combining things that have never been
combined before. There is no reason the same can’t be true of novelty,
nonobviousness, and infringement analysis.
B. Burdens of Proof
A second worry that animates the resistance to point-of-novelty analysis is one about the blurring of burdens of proof. For example, the Federal
Circuit in Egyptian Goddess was concerned that the point-of-novelty element of infringement analysis allowed the defendant to sneak an invalidity
argument (which he would have had to prove by clear and convincing evidence) into infringement, thereby taking advantage of a lower burden of
proof.126 This is the reason the Federal Circuit rejects “practicing the prior
art” as a defense.
The fact that infringement and validity involve different burdens of
proof is a good reason to keep the analysis of the two legally separate.127
125

See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678–79 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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But it doesn’t justify paying no attention to the point of novelty. It is perfectly straightforward to focus on the novel aspect of the patentee’s invention separately in both inquiries, asking whether the defendant implemented
the novel feature of the invention and whether the defendant can prove that
feature was not in fact novel.128
A focus on the point of novelty, even with different burdens of proof,
avoids the conundrum created by Egyptian Goddess by which the defendant
can infringe a design patent by copying only elements that are unquestionably in the prior art. We can still separate validity and infringement analysis
and apply a different burden of proof, and we should. But we will at least
be focusing both of those analyses on the right questions.
C. Patentable Subject Matter
A final proffered justification for the status quo lies in the history of
point-of-novelty analysis in patentable subject matter. Patent subject matter
eligibility is generally quite broad, but abstract ideas, laws of nature, and
natural phenomena are excluded from its scope.129 The courts have long
distinguished between the patenting of natural laws or phenomena themselves and the patenting of practical applications or uses of those natural
laws. The former are forbidden, but the latter are not.130 Indeed, most inventions at their heart involve a new application of some natural law or object.
In 1978, however, the Supreme Court decided Parker v. Flook.131 The
patent there involved the use of a computer program to calculate an “alarm
limit” in a catalytic conversion process to warn that it might need to be shut
down if temperature, pressure, or flow got too high.132 The physical process
was known in the prior art, but the computer program and the mathematical
formula it employed were new.133 The Court ignored that fact, however:
[T]he novelty of the mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all.
Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of the

submitted art, relying almost exclusively on prior art they find themselves.” The Supreme Court recently considered this issue but declined to narrow the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. Microsoft
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242–43 (2011). What is clear is that the patent statute requires at least some burden of proof be placed on defendants, see 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006), so the burdens
of proof for infringement and validity will never be identical.
128
It is true that at some point in this process the court will have to identify a novel feature of the
invention, so it may make sense to approach validity first if the parties cannot agree on the alleged point
of novelty.
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claimed invention, as one of the “basic tools of scientific and technological
work,” it is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.134

The court offered an interesting twist on the point of novelty: it dissected
the invention to find the point of novelty but then concluded that the novel
mathematical algorithm should be ignored because mathematical algorithms
shouldn’t count. That conclusion was quite remarkable. Under that approach, many drugs would be unpatentable because the discovery of their
efficacy involves the mere identification of a previously unknown natural
phenomenon.135 Computer software would be unpatentable because it is
composed of algorithms. Even the classic mercury thermometer might not
be patentable because it was based on the discovery of a physical attribute
of mercury: the fact that it expands at a predictable rate as temperature increases.136
Fortunately, this Flook approach was short-lived. The Supreme Court
repudiated it three years later in Diamond v. Diehr, which held valid a patent claim almost exactly parallel to the one in Flook.137 Since Diehr, it has
been generally accepted that patentable subject matter is evaluated by considering the claim as a whole. As long as some elements of the claim include some physical device or transform an article to another state or thing,
it doesn’t matter that the novel piece of the invention is based on an abstract
idea or a natural phenomenon.138 While the Federal Circuit and Supreme
Court decisions in Bilski v. Kappos revived parts of Flook’s holding, they
did not revive its dissection approach.139
It may be reasonable, therefore, to worry that a general focus on the
point of novelty of the patent will mark a return to the bad old days of restrictive patentable subject matter eligibility. In fact, however, the two are
not necessarily connected. First, the substantive restrictions on patenting
abstract ideas or laws of nature are arguably misguided.140 There is good
reason not to allow the patenting of ideas that we were already using,
134
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whether knowingly or unknowingly. But the novelty and inherency doctrines accommodate that concern.141 There is also good reason not to grant a
patent on an idea in the abstract142 before it has been put to a specific, valuable use, but the utility doctrine specifically forecloses that possibility.143
And there is good reason to worry about overbroad patent claims that lock
up a wide swath of potential future applications. But the enablement and
written description doctrines largely address that concern.144 If my discovery of a previously unknown idea or natural phenomenon has resulted in
useful applications that the world never had before, and if I limit my patent
claim to those useful applications, why shouldn’t I be entitled to a patent?
Second, even if we think it important to preserve a separate abstract
idea doctrine and not to count the new discovery itself, it is possible to do
so in a point-of-novelty regime without adopting the dubious reasoning of
Flook. Consider the thermometer. We could call the point of novelty the
temperature-responsive expansion of the element mercury, and—per
Flook—disentitle it to patent protection. But we don’t have to. We might
instead observe that the application of that fact about the natural world—
putting the mercury in a test tube and marking it with temperature indicators—is itself the point of novelty. Or the point of novelty could be the
combination of the natural phenomenon with the practical application.
In short, the no-point-of-novelty rule has had the incidental benefit of
avoiding a problematic interpretation of patentable subject matter. But that
fact doesn’t justify the whole edifice. We can and should reject the reasoning of Parker v. Flook even in a point-of-novelty regime.
CONCLUSION
Patent law today goes out of its way to avoid focusing attention on
what the patentee actually invented—the point of novelty of the invention.
As one might suspect, the results have not been encouraging. We will better foster invention if we pay more attention to the inventions we are supposed to be promoting. Within some doctrines, the Federal Circuit does
this either expressly or implicitly. In other areas, however, its refusal to pay
attention to the point of novelty results in problematic outcomes. Going
forward, courts should focus on the point of novelty in assessing patents.
Doing so would be an important step towards a patent law that focuses on
141

See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 407–08 (2005)
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what the patentee actually invented rather than what the patent lawyers
wrote.
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